Introduction
Why have the economies of sub-Saharan Africa grown so slowly, if at all, over the last 30 years? Several recent papers have sought the answers in the policies of African governments. Frequently it is argued that Africa's slow growth is associated with political instability and bad policy outcomes: low schooling, underdeveloped financial systems, distorted foreign exchange markets, high government deficits and inadequate infrastructure. The policy record contrasts sharply with that of other, more successful economies, notably those in East Asia.
Yet the comparison with East Asia should alert us to the possibility that disappointing policy outcomes alone do not provide a full explanation of Africa's underperformance. We also need to understand why those outcomes differ across regions and countries. Recent commentators on East Asia have also drawn attention to the way in which initial conditions were particularly favourable to the region's growth (Rodrik, 1995; Booth, 1997; Temple, 1997) . A natural counterpart to this argument is that Africa has suffered the consequences of unfavourable initial conditions. These could hinder growth directly, or by affecting the policy choices of governments, or the translation of policy choices into outcomes. Their various roles in Africa's slow growth are the main theme of this paper.
In one respect, Africa's initial conditions should have worked in its favour. In the 1960s African countries had low capital stocks. Other things being equal, a given rate of investment would hence have been more productive in Africa than elsewhere. Taking the simple conditional convergence story at face value, and controlling for investment rates, one might have expected African countries to grow relatively quickly. What went wrong?
Easterly and Levine (1997) have emphasised the region's high ethnic diversity. This is likely to have raised political instability, undermining investment and growth. Easterly and Levine use regressions to show that the cross-country variation in ethnic diversity helps explain growth differentials, and also part of the variation in policy outcomes across countries. Sachs and Warner (1997) also use growth regressions that include initial conditions, in their case Africa's geography and resource endowments. Many African countries are landlocked and subject to a tropical climate. Perhaps more importantly, African countries have tended to specialise in exporting primary goods, and this may have worked against Africa's long-run growth. For instance, theories of dynamic comparative advantage can be used to argue that East Asia may have done well partly because the region was already specialising in manufacturing by the early 1960s (Temple, 1997) .
To some extent, today's policy outcomes are tomorrow's initial conditions, and the distinction between them is not always clear-cut. It is useful to think of initial conditions as ranged along a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are factors that are plausibly exogenous (geography, ethnic diversity) . At the other end are the results of previous policies (education, health care). Somewhere in the middle are variables that are influenced by policy, but are likely to change only slowly (social arrangements, income distribution).
The empirical work in this paper focuses on two variables that change only slowly (social arrangements and income distribution) and one that is exogenous for most purposes (ethnic diversity).
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Many papers have investigated the role of inequality, but few have specifically examined its role in relation to Africa. Microeconomic studies of social arrangements, particularly 'social capital', have begun to appear, but macroeconomic work is rare. Finally, it seems useful to assess the robustness of earlier research on ethnic diversity, and particularly to investigate the possibility of non-linear effects, for reasons explained later. In passing, I will also look at some other initial conditions, including geography and trade specialisation. However, to avoid spreading the empirical effort too thinly, these subjects are not treated in depth. It is worth noting that papers by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) already cover some of this ground.
As in the work of Sachs and Warner, here the main vehicle for investigating the role of initial conditions is the cross-country growth regression. It would not be too difficult to present arbitrary regressions supporting the role of income distribution and social arrangements in explaining the slow growth in Africa. Instead, I follow a different line, and use the new variables to extend the empirical models of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Sachs and Warner (1997) . Hence the paper can be seen as both an extension of this earlier work and a test of its robustness. Both aspects feed into the paper's central aim, which is to identify important initial conditions, and explore their role in explaining growth and policy outcomes.
The emphasis on initial conditions can be seen as an attempt to arrive at a more complete explanation of the growth difference between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. In cross-country regressions, researchers have frequently been unable to eliminate a dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa; a large part of its slow growth is left unexplained by the usual set of variables. Studies such as Barro (1991) , Easterly and Levine (1997) and Schmidt-Hebbel (1996) consistently find that the African dummy is significant and negative. Among recent studies, only Sachs and Warner (1997) are able to eliminate the Africa dummy.
A concern with all these cross-country studies is that the results may partly be driven by a few outlying countries. Sub-Saharan Africa includes one of the world's fastest growing countries, Botswana, and one of the slowest, Zambia. These two countries were identified as influential outliers in the empirical models of De Long and Summers (1991) . In this paper I am equally careful to identify observations that might exert undue influence on the final results. The next section discusses econometric issues in more detail.
In Section 3 I use robust estimation methods to examine previous results in the literature. Section 4 introduces the middle income share, the measure of income distribution used in this paper. Section 5 discusses the empirical assessment of social arrangements. The core of the paper is Sections 6 and 7: Section 6 considers the possible role of the new variables in Africa's growth experience, while Section 7 analyses their role in the determination of policy outcomes. Section 8 discusses the role of ethnic diversity in the light of the new results of earlier sections. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Econometric Techniques
The empirical work in this paper is based on two data sets -those assembled by Easterly and Levine (1997) and by Sachs and Warner (1997) (henceforth EL and SW respectively) . The EL data set has the advantage that it provides three observations on growth and policy for each country, covering the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. A natural question is how we can make the best use of the time series ('within') variation in the data, as well as the cross-section Cbetween') variation. A second question is how we can make sure that we characterise the most coherent part of the data, rather than being led astray by a few outliers. The remainder of this section addresses these two questions in turn.
Treatment of Country-specific Effects
Start with the first question, the choice of estimation method. EL estimate each equation by seemingly unrelated regressions: there is a cross-section regression for each time period, with the parameters constrained to be the same across time periods, but correlation of the error terms allowed. This method allows for serially correlated shocks, but not for the country-specific intercepts that some papers in the literature have emphasised (e.g., Islam, 1995) . These country-specific intercepts can proxy for time-invariant variables omitted from the regressions, such as initial efficiency.
Allowing for country-specific intercepts is not straightforward in the EL growth regressions. The growth model is dynamic in that it implicitly includes a lagged dependent variable (the initial level of income). Hence the random and fixed effects estimators will be biased. Not only that, initial income enters as a quadratic, so standard results on biases in dynamic panel data models do not apply.
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It should also be noted that we cannot properly deal with unobserved country-specific intercepts that are correlated with the regressors. Any attempt to eliminate these country effects, by first differencing or the within-groups transformation, will also eliminate the time-invariant initial conditions. Hence it is not possible to allow for fixed effects in the main part of the analysis.
We can, though, assess the sensitivity of the coefficients on the other variables to the assumptions made about the country effects, hi Section 3 I briefly report the results of some simple, if flawed, tests of robustness. Although I mainly concentrate on pooled time-series cross-section regressions, I also assess the sensitivity of the results to the use of random effects and fixed effects estimators. For each EL growth regression I carry out a Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects, based on Baltagi and Li (1990) , and a Hausman specification test. In this context, the latter exercise can be seen as a joint test of (i) general mis-specification and (ii) the random effects assumption that the country-specific intercepts are uncorrelated with the regressors.
Interestingly, for the EL growth regressions, the LM test for the absence of random effects frequently does not reject. Often, the Hausman test also does not reject. Hence it turns out that the growth regressions turn out to be fairly robust to the estimation of random or fixed effects models. Not too much weight should be placed on this. Given that the regressions are dynamic, all the estimation methods will give biased results. However, it remains interesting to note that the exclusion of outliers will turn out to be more important to the results than the choice of estimation method.
Outliers
I now turn to consider the question of outliers in more detail. The sample sensitivity of some cross-country empirical studies is well known. One advance of this paper over earlier work is the use of a robust estimator, least trimmed squares, as a complement to more conventional methods. The least trimmed squares estimator minimises the sum of squares over half the observations. One way of thinking about this informally is that the estimator seeks out that part of the data for which the model has greatest explanatory power (as measured by the R 2 ) and then bases the parameter estimates on just that portion of the data. The distance between the estimates obtained by ordinary least squares, and those from least trimmed squares, can be seen as an indication of the reliability of the results. When the two sets of estimates are very different, then it may be that the observations are drawn from several different regimes, and/or that the OLS estimates are driven by a few outliers.
With this in mind, each regression in the paper is estimated in two stages. In the first stage, I use least trimmed squares (LTS). Secondly, observations with high residuals in the LTS regression are classed as outliers, and a sufficient number are excluded from an OLS regression so that the regression parameters of interest are close to those in the first stage LTS estimates. This typically means excluding about 10-15% of the sample. This second stage, excluding outliers from an otherwise straightforward OLS regression, is an example of 're-weighted least squares', or RWLS, as recommended by Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) . The technique should ensure that the findings are not unduly influenced by any small group of outlying observations. (The same set of outliers is omitted from the random effects and fixed effects estimates, where carried out.)
The exclusion of outliers from the regressions is sometimes important to the results. Exclusion can be justified on at least two general grounds. Remember that an observation is excluded when it is some distance away from the regression surface estimated by LTS. One reason for this may be that the observation incorporates a substantial amount of measurement error, and therefore should not be allowed to influence the results substantially. In this case, though, the countries excluded from the regressions should usually be common across different specifications. In practice, they are not.
An explanation is given by a second motivation for excluding outliers, which is more subtle and has wider applicability. A common objection to cross-country growth regressions is that the countries are unlikely to lie on a common surface. Equivalently, parameter heterogeneity is thought likely. When we impose a simple constantparameter model on the data, the fact that it is only a rough approximation is likely to mean that some observations emerge as outliers. Use of LTS acknowledges this problem, since it can be seen as an attempt to characterise the most coherent part of the data. [The technique has previously been applied by Temple (1997 Temple ( ,1998 .] When the RWLS regressions are carried out, four diagnostic tests are implemented. The first is the test for normality of the residuals described by Doornik and Hansen (1994) . The second is a test for heteroscedasticity, called HSW here. It is based on White (1980) , and uses an auxiliary regression of the squared residuals on the original regressors and all their squares. A third test HSF is that originally suggested by White (1980) , and involves a regression of the squared residuals on all squares and cross-products of the regressors. This can be seen as a joint test for heteroscedasticity and mis-specification; as with the HSW test, the auxiliary regression can be used to identify problematic variables. Finally, the RESET test of functional form due to Ramsey (1969) is also reported where necessary. For each test, I report the p-value of the null hypothesis, where the null is that the model is correctly specified. Hence any p-value >0.05 indicates that the model fails the corresponding diagnostic test at the 5% significance level.
Earlier Results Revisited
Using the techniques outlined in Section 2, I now examine the robustness of earlier findings on African growth. The aim is partly to demonstrate the techniques ready for later use. More importantly, it helps establish the extent to which previous studies provide a solid foundation for this paper's empirical work.
Since a greater variety of estimation techniques is possible using the EL data set, I concentrate on their results. In the column of Table 1 headed 'SUR', I show how the growth rate changes in EL's most complete empirical model, given a 1 standard deviation increase in the relevant variable. The results are based on the 'seemingly unrelated regression' (SUR) estimates in their table IV, regression (4). The standard deviations are those calculated from the whole sample for the 1960s. For example, a rise in the log of schooling of 1 standard deviation would have raised the growth rate by 0.51 percentage points for the following 10 years. This form of presentation is a natural way of assessing the most important effects.
The second column shows the results of a straightforward OLS regression. As noted by EL, the choice of OLS or SUR makes little difference to the results, and any efficiency gain is marginal. The model fails a diagnostic test, since the errors do not appear to be normally distributed. The model almost fails a joint test of homoscedasticity and correct specification at the 10% level (p-value = 0.1009). In both cases, outliers may be at the root of the problem.
The next three columns of Table 1 show the growth effects estimated by more robust means. As explained earlier, a selection of outlying observations is identified by LTS, and then removed from an otherwise straightforward OLS regression. (This is an example of re-weighted least squares, hence 'RWLS' in the third column.) Finally, the possible outliers are also excluded from random (RE) and fixed effects (FE) estimates. 4 It is clear from Table 1 that the omission of potential outliers makes a greater difference to the results than the choice of estimation technique. In particular, for the 160 observations in the reduced sample, the effects of schooling and financial depth on growth appear to be weak. Another finding is that, when outliers are excluded, a direct effect of ethnic diversity is hard to detect. This is not particularly worrying, because it seems likely that the main effects of such diversity are mediated through policy variables already included in the growth equation. This claim is supported by the policy regressions in table VI of EL, and I found that these regressions stand up well to robust estimation.
Another possibility should not go unmentioned. The direct effect of ethnic diversity may be non-linear. It is worth noting that Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find that the probability of civil war as a function of ethnic diversity is an inverse-U shape, so that civil wars become less likely at very high levels of diversity Non-linear effects of ethnic diversity may be felt through other channels as well. For these reasons, later models will include a quadratic effect of the variable measuring ethnic diversity, ETHNIC.
I have also investigated the robustness of the SW results, based on simple cross-section growth regressions for 1965-90. Diagnostic tests on their table 2 regressions are generally satisfactory. SW take some care over outliers, but note that their methods may miss groups of countries with outlying data. 5 In practice, this appears to be a problem in only one instance. The national saving rate for 1970-89 is insignificant in the SW results. When China, the Congo, Egypt, Guatemala and Syria are excluded from the sample, the saving rate is then significant at the 10% level. This suggests that the variables used by SW do not fully account for the cross-country variation in saving rates.
Income Distribution
Overall, the earlier papers by EL and SW seem to provide a useful foundation on which to build. In the remainder of the paper I will extend their results by including variables measuring income distribution and social arrangements, and by controlling for a potentially non-linear effect of ethnic diversity. Later I will consider the role of initial conditions in the determination of policy outcomes. In this section I first discuss the use of data on income distribution, and its worldwide pattern. The emphasis on a possible role for income distribution should be uncontroversial. Work by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Persson and Tabellini (1994) , Clarke (1995) and Perotri (1996) tends to suggest that the role of high inequality in slow growth is one of the more robust results in the cross-country literature. Using a new data set, Deininger and Squire (1996b) have cast some doubt on the finding, but even they find an effect of land distribution.
Why might inequality affect growth? In the theoretical literature, one of the most studied effects of inequality is that on political demands for redistribution. At first sight, this theory does not have much relevance for Africa, given that democracy has generally been fragile and short-lived: even by 1991, only 13% of the population was living in states in which legislators had been chosen in contested multi-party elections (Collier and Gunning, 1997) . One reply is that even dictators are subject to political pressures and incentives, through civil unrest and corruption.
Perhaps more relevant are theories emphasising the interaction between inequality, borrowing constraints and education. Galor and Zeira (1993) argue that, in the absence of perfect capital markets, human capital investments are higher given a large middle class. Theories of this type sometimes suggest that the relation between inequality and growth may vary depending on the level of per capita income; this result is obtained by both Perotti (1993) and Garcia-Penalosa (1995) , who suggest that inequality is beneficial to growth in poor countries, but has an adverse effect in richer ones.
In this paper I use an income distribution statistic reported by Perotti (1996) , the income share of the middle class (MID), as represented by the income share of the third and fourth quintiles. This statistic may correspond only loosely to notions of inequality. However, the measure is strongly negatively correlated with the 1960s inequality statistics used by Clarke (1995) , particularly for the few joint observations in sub-Saharan Africa. Hence it is often reasonable to take a high middle income share as evidence of greater equality.
Why use MID and not a more straightforward index of inequality, like the Gird coefficient? For our purposes, MID has several advantages. It is available for more sub-Saharan African countries, it corresponds to theoretical emphasis on the income share of the middle class, and Perotti adjusts figures from surveys of individual incomes to bring them into line with household surveys. Preliminary investigation suggested that MID gave slightly stronger results than alternatives. are missing. If data availability is not randomly determined, the table may give a distorted view. Even so, the table does seem to bear out the common assumption that sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America are the most unequal regions in the world, and Northern Europe the most equal.
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At this stage it is also worth noting an interesting stylised fact: the countries with very low middle income shares tend to have a relatively high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP. 7 The relationship is shown in Figure 1 . To some extent, this correlation may simply be the outcome of a varying level of development. Even so, it is possible that in what follows the middle income share may act as a proxy for endowments of natural resources. I will return to this interpretation where necessary.
Measuring Social Arrangements
Several recent studies investigate the macroeconomic consequences of social arrangements, including Knack and Keefer (1997) and Temple and Johnson (1998) . A common focus is 'social capital', a term which the economics literature has taken to denote the quality of civil society: the extent of trust, associational memberships, and general social and political participation. As Woolcock (1998) notes, these could be seen as consequences of social capital, not the capital itself, and more generally the concept can be read in several different ways. In this section I discuss a possible measure of social capital and its interpretation.
For developing countries, comparable data on social capital or its In what follows, this measure will be called SOCDEV. Table 3 shows the component 'social' variables included in the factor analysis used to construct SOCDEV, and the factor loadings. The values of the final index (the factor scores for the first factor) are listed in ascending order in Table 4 , with sub-Saharan African countries shown in bold as before. The three groups correspond to those selected by Adelman and Morris.
The striking thing about Table 3 is the way in which sub-Saharan African countries nearly all fall into the first group -that associated with the most traditional societies. Thus, this variable does seem to offer some hope of removing the stubborn Africa dummy. However, before embracing SOCDEV too enthusiastically, some thought about its interpretation is required. Adelman and Morris started from the idea that societies vary from traditional to modern along a variety of dimensions, such as family relations, the extent of communications, the importance of the middle class, social mobility and general 'modernisation of outlook'. Societies that are more traditional in these respects may be inherently less suited to entrepreneurship and modern economic development.
This was the core idea of 'modernisation theory', which played a central role in development studies in the 1950s and 1960s. The theory saw some form of social modernisation as a prerequisite for successful economic development. It has been rightly criticised, as the survey by Moore (1997) makes abundantly clear. Some of the central concepts and arguments are problematic, to the extent that the approach is widely regarded as discredited. A fundamental objection is that to define societies as 'traditional' simply because they depart from Western norms and values is dangerously misleading.
One particularly interesting line of criticism is that some aspects of outwardly traditional societies represent a rational response to economic problems. Collier and Gunning (1997) survey some of this work, and emphasise that traditional village communities and the extended kin group can be seen as overcoming particular difficulties, allowing, for instance, some degree of smoothing in consumption when credit markets are weak and asset holdings scarce.
However, it may be that these responses to the economic environment may ultimately have a detrimental effect on long-run growth, if social institutions and relationships have not been sufficiently fast to adapt to changed economic conditions. Recent work on social capital attempts to pinpoint some of the ways in which social factors may contribute to economic development, but with a deeper appreciation than modernisation theorists of the importance of interactions between individuals.
In an incisive discussion of recent work, Woolcock (1998) distinguishes between four dimensions of social capital: the extent of social integration, horizontal associations or linkages, the relation between the state and civil society, and the quality of institutions. As is clear from Table 4 , the construction of the SOCDEV measure could be seen as capturing any or all of these dimensions, with the possible exception of institutional quality.
Thus, the index may act as a proxy for social capital. However, it is worth bearing in mind that the social capital literature, as it relates to development, is part of a wider recognition that economists sometimes leave too much out. For instance, new and interesting theories on social mobility and growth are emerging, ones which do not necessarily have a strong connection to social capital as this term is usually understood. For this reason, Temple and Johnson (1998) call the Adelman-Morris index a measure of 'social capability', where this name is understood to capture broader aspects of society than social capital. As a reminder of this broader conception of social effects, I will often use that term here.
Of course, SOCDEV may not be particularly good at capturing the many aspects of social arrangements that could be relevant, especially since the use of a single index implicitly assumes that these aspects tend to move together. In practice, the measures of the 'social' variables used to construct SOCDEV are highly correlated, which supports the idea that reduction to a single index is a legitimate step.
Unfortunately, SOCDEV is also highly correlated with some variables that are less obviously indicators of social arrangements. For instance, there is a high correlation between this variable and life expectancy (shown in Figure 2 ). Throughout the paper, it is possible that SOCDEV proxies for health status, or for just one of its component variables. The chosen interpretation is likely to depend on the set of underlying mechanisms one finds most convincing.
Despite this difficulty, use of the Adelman-Morris index retains one formidable advantage. Since it was constructed in the early 1960s, its values are uncontaminated by knowledge of subsequent growth performance. Hence it is very useful in examining whether the origins of Africa's slow growth might partly be traced to the nature of its social arrangements.
There are three final points which are relevant to some of the findings in the paper. First, the final construction of the SOCDEV index does not incorporate an assessment of the degree of cultural and ethnic homogeneity, even though Adelman and Morris included such a variable in their initial surveys. Hence the effects of their final index can be distinguished from those of ethnic diversity, which will be important in some of the later discussion. Figure 3 shows the relation between social capability and ethnic diversity. As one might conjecture, the two are negatively correlated (r = -0.60), indicating that highly diverse societies are more likely to have low social capability. Given that ethnic diversity is the variable which can best claim to be predetermined, this correlation should be borne in mind throughout the paper. Sometimes the positive effect of SOCDEV is relatively strong and the negative effect of ETHNIC surprisingly weak: one explanation is that the adverse effects of ethnic diversity are partly mediated through endogenous social arrangements. This could easily be related to the literature on social capital; for instance, it might be that one consequence of ethnic diversity is a low level of trust. Finally, introducing SOCDEV has an interesting side-effect on the sample. Since the focus of Adelman and Morris was on development, their index was constructed for only the 74 countries that they considered to be less developed in the early 1960s. Thus, the results from any regressions including this variable can also be seen as a test of whether the EL and SW findings hold for samples restricted to an ex ante choice of developing countries. It is arguably crucial that growth and policy regressions should have some explanatory power within the set of developing countries, rather than just relying on very broad-brush differences between the developing and developed worlds.
The Direct Growth Effects
hi this section I extend the earlier models to include MID and SOCDEV. The results for the EL growth regressions are shown in Table  5 . In one of the regressions the Africa dummy is insignificant at the 10% level, but overall the results suggest that the extended model still falls short of explaining Africa's relative performance.
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The effect of ethnic diversity is interesting, hi Table 5 I report the p-value from an F-test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on ETHNIC and ETHNIC squared are both zero. The variables are jointly significant at the 10% level in regressions (1) and (2), in which there is a U-shaped relation between growth and ethnic diversity. Growth 9 A more complete model might seek to take into account the effects of climate or output instability (Ghura, 1995) , colonial history (Bertocchi and Canova, 1996) , export instability (Gyimah-Bremponfj, 1991), political instability (Fosu, 1992) , or the external debt burden and inflation (Ojo and Oshikoya, 1995) . The role of institutions is also likely to be crucial (Aron, 1997). reaches a low point when the ethnic diversity index is around 0.65. This suggests that an intermediate range of ethnic diversity is the most damaging for growth. Since the effect disappears in regressions (3) and (4), this non-linear effect appears to arise through policy outcomes. This is a point I will return to later in the paper.
The results for SOCDEV suggest two things: (i) social arrangements do influence growth, and that is (ii) mainly by acting through government policy outcomes. The variable is significant at the 5% level in regressions (1) and (2) but less significant (though still positive) when controlling for various government policy indicators. In regression (4) a rise of 1 standard deviation in the social capability index is associated with an increase in the growth rate of 0.7 percentage points.
In contrast, the effect of MID is strengthened when policy outcomes are included. Once a selection of policies is controlled for, as in regressions (3) and (4), a low middle income share is seen to be an obstacle to growth. Again the effect is a strong one: in regression (4) a 1 standard deviation decrease in the middle income share is found to lower the growth rate by 0.7 percentage points. These results reinforce earlier findings that income distribution matters for growth, but use a different sample and estimation method, and build on a specification established earlier in the literature.
It can be seen from Table 5 that an LM test for random effects rejects their presence in each case. I have confirmed this by carrying out random effects estimation: the effect of social capability and income distribution is preserved in the RE estimates. Indeed, in regressions (3) and (4) SOCDEV emerges as more strongly significant when using random effects estimation.
Since the initial conditions are naturally time-invariant, fixed effects estimation will only be useful as a broad indication of robustness. In practice, Hausman tests do not reject in three out of the four regressions. Hence, even if there are country-specific intercepts, there is little to suggest that these are strongly correlated with the regressors. Finally, the pooled time-series cross-section results reported in Table 5 are not rejected by the battery of diagnostic tests outlined in Section 2.
I have also experimented with simple cross-section growth regressions for 1965-90 based on SW's work, but now including SOCDEV, ETHNIC and sometimes MID. The use of MID restricts the sample to just 35-37 countries. In these regressions (not reported) SOCDEV is positively signed and sometimes significant, but the effect of most of the other variables is imprecisely measured, including MID and the Africa dummy.
The lack of precisely measured income distribution effects is explained partly by the small sample and partly by the inclusion of natural resource exports as a share of GDP. It is possible that earlier results in the literature on income inequality are really driven by resource endowment effects. Alternatively, given the high correlation between income distribution and trade specialisation noted earlier, it is possible that the latter variable affects growth through the mechanisms envisaged in the inequality and growth literature.
Since the inclusion of MID greatly restricts the sample, I have also carried out regressions which do not include this variable. I start with a regression which omits all the policy outcomes and includes only initial conditions, including SW's dummy variables for landlockedness and a tropical climate, and the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP, together with SOCDEV and ETHNIC. In further regressions I gradually add policy indicators, such as openness to trade. Again, LTS is used to identify outliers.
The results are shown in Table 6 . Note that regression (1) uses only the set of initial conditions and an adjustment for labour force growth, but explains nearly 80% of the variation in developing country growth rates. This should not be taken to indicate that policies are unimportant, since it may be that initial conditions have their effect via policy choices and outcomes -a point I will return to in the next section.
The high explanatory power of these regressions appears to suggest that they are close to capturing most of the relevant initial conditions. However, these variables could be simply proxying for others. Not only that, the dummy for sub-Saharan African countries is still significant and quantitatively important. Even the initial conditions This contrasts with the work of Sachs and Warner, who were able to eliminate the Africa dummy without much difficulty. In this sample, the task is more difficult. One explanation is that it is easy to explain Africa's underperformance relative to a world sample (including developed countries) but more difficult when attention is restricted to an ex ante choice of developing countries. One obvious candidate for the missing variable would be political instability.
Returning to the initial conditions, there is little effect of the dummy variable for landlocked countries but a tropical climate has a negative effect, as does the GDP share of natural resource exports. SOCDEV has the expected positive sign but is significant only at the 20% level, and its significance lessens as policy outcomes are added. Its effect is particularly imprecise when life expectancy is included, but neither is life expectancy itself significant. This tends to reinforce the qualification made earlier, that SOCDEV is highly correlated with health status, making its interpretation problematic.
When deciding which factor -health status or social arrangements -is most relevant, it is interesting to note the positive correlation between SOCDEV and measures of investment. Temple and Johnson (1998) briefly discuss this correlation in a sample of developing countries. It is interesting to note that the same relationship holds even within Africa: Figure 4 shows a clear positive relation between SOCDEV and the average investment ratio . (The data on investment is taken from version 5.6 of the Perm World Table. ) This correlation is consistent with a scenario in which the returns to investment are higher, and more likely to be taken up, in societies relatively well suited to entrepreneurship and economic development. This scenario perhaps seems more plausible than one that links physical capital investment to life expectancy or other measures of health status. The effect of ethnic diversity is worth noting. When both ETHNIC and the square of ETHNIC are included, as in the Table 6 regressions, the two variables are jointly significant. There is some evidence that it is an intermediate range of ethnic diversity that has the worst effect on growth, although the turning point cannot be estimated with any degree of precision. Somewhat surprisingly, if the square of ETHNIC is excluded, ETHNIC is positively signed. I will return to the robustness of ethnic diversity in Section 8. 
Determinants of Policy Outcomes
This section considers the influence of initial conditions on policy outcomes. At present there is a general consensus that we lack empirically powerful theoretical models of how policies are determined, or how policy choices are translated into outcomes. Fishlow (1991) notes that 'what development economics lacks is an adequate theory of government policy' (p. 1736). The 'new political economy' has made some useful contributions, but as Grindle (1991) points out, it is rarely successful at explaining observed instances of reform. Perhaps the establishment of some stylised facts about policy outcomes will assist in formulating wider theories of policy determination, and the link between choices and outcomes. Table 7 shows the correlations of MID, SOCDEV and ETHNIC with the 1980s values of variables used by EL, and an index of sociopolitical instability reported in Perotti (1996) . The correlations between policy outcomes and the three initial conditions almost all have the expected signs, and a low middle income share is associated with higher socio-political instability. These correlations, and those that follow, can only indicate associations, and strong conclusions about causality should not be drawn. Even so, the exercise remains useful. As Mankiw (1995) observes, 'correlations among endogenous variables can rule out theories that fail to produce the correlations, and they can thereby raise our confidence in theories that do produce them'.
With this in mind, I now turn to a more complete modelling of policy outcomes, the intention being to reveal links between them and initial conditions. The policy outcomes are the same as those modelled by EL and, as in that paper, I use data from all three decades (1960s, 1970s and 1980s) . This is problematic to the extent that African countries were colonised and that policy outcomes reflect government choices, in which case it is not clear exactly whose policy choices are being explained. 10 However, most African countries were independent by 1966; only Lesotho, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Swaziland and the Portugese colonies were not, and most of these countries are not in the sample in White (1985) jackknife heteroscedasticity-consistent t-ratios in parentheses. •Significant at the 5% level, indicating a rejection of normality, homoscedasticity, correct functional form, or the 'no random effects' assumption. any case. Hence there' is plenty of variation in the data which is not driven by the decisions of the metropolitan countries. If there is a remaining problem, it is likely to be in the use of school attainment, a variable which will respond very slowly to new policies.
The first set of results is shown in Table 8 . The regressions are based on data from EL, and use data for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The use of SOCDEV and MID considerably restricts the sample compared with those investigated by EL. In particular, only countries that Adelman and Morris (1967) considered to be less developed are included. As before, around 10% of the sample is excluded as unrepresentative.
(Full details of the samples used are available on request.) The regression for 'schooling' models the log of one plus average years of school attainment, at the beginning of each decade. 'Finance' refers to financial depth, represented by the ratio of the liquid liabilities of the financial system to GDP, decade average. The regression for 'BMP' models the log of one plus the black market premium, decade average. 'Fiscal' is the ratio of the central government surplus to GDP, decade average. Finally, the 'communications' model uses data on telephones per worker as a proxy for communications infrastructure.
Given a particular level of initial income, a high middle income share is associated with good schooling, good financial depth and a low black market premium, but also with high budget deficits and a weak communications infrastructure. Countries with a low level of social capability or social capital also have less schooling, weak financial systems, high budget deficits and less extensive communications. However, it should be remembered that these are only associations, and that conclusions about causality are hard to draw with any confidence.
In particular, the correlation with schooling is difficult to interpret, partly because causality could run in either direction and partly because literacy is one of the components of the Adelman-Morris index of social capability. Similar points, although with less force, could be made in relation to communications. However, Temple and Johnson (1998) experiment with a variety of social development indices based on the raw data in Adelman and Morris (1967) , and find that the exclusion of literacy from the calculations makes little difference to the final index of social development.
Another danger with the approach used here is that income is endogenous. Since income is determined by policy outcomes, it will tend to be correlated with the random component of policy outcomes, and hence the estimates will be inconsistent. To avoid this, I have re-estimated the Table 8 regressions using some instrumental variables suggested by the work of Hall and Jones (1996) . Income is instrumented using latitude, latitude squared and the fraction of years between 1950 and 1994 that each country has pursued an open trade regime. The results are rather less precise, but MID remains associated with more schooling, greater financial depth and a lower black market premium. Higher levels of SOCDEV remain associated with more schooling and greater financial depth.
The Baltagi-Li LM test indicates the presence of random effects in the Table 8 policy regressions. When the regressions are re-estimated to take into account random effects, the pattern of signs is largely unchanged, but the estimates are considerably less precise. However, it is not clear that this is the more reliable set of results. The random effects estimator is a matrix-weighted average of the cross-section (between) and fixed effects (within) estimators. In these policy outcome regressions only income varies over time, so there is unlikely to be much useful information in the within estimates.
Although the evidence reported in Tables 7 and 8 can only indicate associations, it may be used to guide theoretical work on the determination of policy outcomes. I now briefly consider some mechanisms through which income distribution and social arrangements might influence policy choices and their translation into outcomes.
The natural argument is that outcomes are adversely affected by political instability and war. Easterly and Levine use nine measures of instability: the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, cabinet changes, constitutional changes, coups, government crises, purges, revolutions and riots (Banks, 1994) . For the 1960s, these nine measures turn out to be only weakly correlated with MID and SOCDEV, sometimes with unexpected signs. For better results, perhaps what is needed is a structural model of instability, as in Collier and Hoeffler's (1998) work on the probability of civil war, or that of Jenkins and Kposowa (1990) on the incidence of coups. This kind of work is particularly important in the light of survey evidence suggesting that political instability is one of the main obstacles to investment in Africa (see Collier and Gunning, 1997) .
Other arguments can be suggested. Poor delivery of public services, in particular, may be associated with inequality and low levels of social capital. Isham et al. (1995) show that, where civil liberties are weak, the rate of return on investments appears to be particularly low. They argue that the two are related via the strength of popular protest and the freedom of the media. It may be that, in some societies, the restraints on governments through these means are particularly weak, hence explaining why low levels of social capital are correlated with low schooling and infrastructure investments. Another possibility is that traditional kin groups create opportunities for particularly damaging forms of corruption in the public sector (Collier and Gunning, 1997) .
Another route through which income distribution and social arrangements may affect policy-making is via the ability of political elites. If social capital and low inequality are associated with a more meritocratic society and a stronger educational system, these variables may also be reflected in the competence of policy-makers. Grindle and Thomas (1991) suggest that the influence of technical analysis, and the ability of policy elites to shape debate, is important to reform. Nelson (1984) argues that ministers sometimes have insufficient economic background and understanding; doubts about economic benefits can play a major role in delaying much-needed stabilisations.
It would not be difficult to offer counter-arguments to each of these mechanisms, and the origins of policy outcomes remain somewhat elusive in empirical modelling. The results at least provide some tentative indication that Africa's disappointing policy outcomes can be partly explained by its high inequality and, to a greater extent, by the nature of its social arrangements.
The Robustness of Ethnic Diversity
Completing the investigation of initial conditions, I now turn to the implications of the previous section for the relationship between policy outcomes and ethnic diversity. EL provided some evidence that the two are related. Here I have extended their results, by controlling for MID, SOCDEV and a non-linear effect of initial income. The use of SOCDEV restricts the sample to developing countries, a useful robustness test.
In the Table 8 regressions, the ethnic diversity variables (ETHNIC and its square) are usually jointly significant at the 10% level. However, the effects are not always straightforward. In the case of schooling, the association does not have the expected sign. Interestingly, there is some evidence of a U-shaped relation between ethnic diversity and good policy outcomes. The turning point usually occurs at a diversity index of around 0.4-0.5, consistent with the findings of Collier and Hoeffler (1996) on the likelihood of civil wars. The median value of the diversity index for sub-Saharan Africa is about 0.7, suggesting that at least half the African countries are well beyond the intermediate range of ethnic diversity which is most damaging for the likelihood of internal conflict and poor policy choices.
One possible explanation of these results is that political instability becomes most likely at intermediate ranges of diversity. This is a fairly intuitive idea. A state with two roughly equal sized groups (and hence a diversity index of around 0.5) may be inherently more unstable than one that is very diverse. Horowitz (1985) writes that 'the intensity of any conflict is, in large part, a function of the relative strength of group claims . . . the larger the area of unacknowledged claims to group legitimacy, the more intense the conflict, all else being equal' (p. 215). Situations in which large groups feel their claims to legitimacy are denied, and in which they are strong enough to anticipate successful countering action, may be inherently more likely within an intermediate range of ethnic diversity. Jenkins and Kposowa (1990) review some of the relevant arguments in more detail.
However, it would be wrong to conclude that Africa's relatively high ethnic diversity protects it from instability and bad policy outcomes. Informal studies frequently emphasise ethnic diversity as a fundamental reason for Africa's difficulties. Krymkowski and Hall (1990) write that 'ethnic diversity remains one of the continent's most difficult internal problems . . . because it can prevent or retard the establishment of national political unity' (p. 315). Leis (1995) comments that 'the fragile nature of African states and their multiethnic complexions appear to be part of the root problem' (p. 77).
The first point to make is that the finding of a U-shaped relation is sensitive to the specification and choice of control variables. For instance, say one simply ranks countries by ethnic diversity into four groups of similar size, and then calculates the median value of the policy indicators for each group. The most diverse countries emerge as having the worst policy outcomes.
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Hence the non-linearity result turns on the inclusion of other variables. Perhaps surprisingly, controlling for income does not seem to be central. A remaining explanation of the results in this paper is that countries have a low middle income share, and low social capital, precisely because of ethnic diversity. In this case the regressions above will understate the overall impact, direct and indirect, of high ethnic diversity on policies.
This point has particular force given that ethnic diversity is the closest of the three variables to a genuinely exogenous initial condition. If we make the perhaps heroic assumption that the Adelman-Morris index captures some aspects of social capital, this at least reminds us that the variable is endogenous in the long run. As emphasised earlier, one reason the effect of ethnic diversity is sometimes weak in this paper is likely to be the simultaneous use of SOCDEV, a variable which may partly reflect long-run effects of ethnic diversity.
However, it should also be remembered that the salience of ethnic divisions, and hence their costs, is also likely to be endogenous. In further work it will be useful to think more carefully about the circumstances in which ethnic diversity matters. Krymkowksi and Hall (1990) discuss how ethnic diversity may be a more serious difficulty in the presence of various kinds of inequality.
Another interesting hypothesis is that ethnic divisions are more likely to become politicised in societies that lack social capital. Krymkowski and Hall argue that the formation of national identity, and loyalty to the state, rests on the creation of a civic culture in which each ethnic group is allowed to maintain what it regards as valuable to its ethnic culture while adhering to state-determined values that are common for all groups. However, brief investigations of these issues, using admittedly very simple interaction terms based on MID and SOCDEV, failed to establish unambiguous results. Further work would be useful.
A further avenue to explore is that the problems of ethnic diversity have been exacerbated by Africa's history of colonisation. Leis (1995) argues that the colonialists tended to promote centralised rule-making and administration, sometimes at the expense of already existing political systems that were more egalitarian, democratic and oriented towards consensus. Kaspin (1995) and Turton (1997) point out that the state plays a role in generating factions in civil society, and argue that there was a poliricisation of ethnic consciousness during the colonial period. However, Horowitz (1985, p. 518) notes that, although the anti-colonial struggle may have fed ethnic conflict on some fronts, on others the potential for conflict was lessened.
Overall, in future work it would be interesting to combine the analysis of ethnic diversity with that of political regimes and colonisation.
One could take the view that Africa's history is likely to have exacerbated ethnic divisions, and that Africa may be deficient in the political and social arrangements needed to contain this conflict. In this case, it would be natural to assume that ethnic diversity is more costly in Africa than elsewhere. If true, this would reconcile the more ambiguous findings of this paper with earlier research.
Conclusions
What can the results of this paper contribute to our understanding of growth in Africa and elsewhere? In passing, I have noted that two influential empirical studies stand up quite well to some simple tests of robustness. Thus it would be hard to argue that their central findings are driven by a small group of observations, or by an inappropriate choice of regression specification. This means that more confidence can be placed in empirical models relating Africa's slow growth to bad policy outcomes.
However, identifying adverse effects of bad policy outcomes is only the beginning of an explanation for Africa's recent economic history. We also need to know the determinants of policy outcomes, and the relative importance of initial conditions: perhaps growth might have been slow even if policies were good. Hence we will only come to a better understanding of the sources of Africa's slow growth by getting to grips with the initial conditions. Luckily, as well as being a desirable endeavour, it also seems to be a feasible one. A key finding of this paper is that well over half of the variation in developing country growth rates can be explained by observable variables designed to capture initial conditions. Another important finding to emerge is that developing countries with relatively low social capital seem more likely to have bad policy outcomes, low investment and slow growth. For any two countries with the same level of income, the one with more social capital tends to have more schooling, a more extensive financial system, better fiscal policy and a wider telephone network. Causation could run in both directions, but these results are suggestive.
Several possible explanations were put forward but, as with Easterly and Levine's work on ethnic diversity, the mechanisms by which social arrangements affect policy outcomes still remain somewhat opaque. It should also be clear that the Adelman and Morris index may proxy for other aspects of initial conditions, such as health status. Even so, the results are interesting. They indicate that the disappointing policy outcomes of the 1970s and 1980s had their roots partly in the nature of African societies in the 1960s.
The role of the other initial conditions examined here -income distribution and ethnic diversity -is less straightforward than conventional discussion and earlier studies might indicate. In the empirical models estimated here, a low middle income share has a negative effect only when controlling for policy outcomes. Although income distribution does seem to exert some influence on policy outcomes, robust associations do not always leap out from the data in the way one might expect from informal discussions.
Overall, high income inequality, at least to the extent it is reflected in low middle income shares, does not seem to have been a key source of Africa's slow growth. It is possible that this finding reflects a difference between low-and high-income countries in the effects of inequality as some theorists have suggested. However, firm conclusions require more work.
Concerning ethnic diversity, the results indicate that, even on controlling for national income, it is often associated with worse policy outcomes, but the effects are not straightforward. The strongest correlations are with the financial system and the telephone network. In both cases there is some evidence of a non-linear relation, in which intermediate ranges of ethnic diversity are worst for policy outcomes and growth. Growth effects after controlling for policy outcomes appear to be negligible, consistent with previous research.
Hence the conclusions of the paper can be summarised as follows. Observable variables capturing initial conditions can account for around three-quarters of the variation in developing country growth rates. These variables affect growth mainly by determining policy outcomes. Of the three initial conditions studied here, the extent of social capital appears to be the most important. Concerning ethnic diversity, there is some evidence that an intermediate range of diversity is worst for growth. Future work on ethnic diversity needs to take a more sharply focused approach, particularly to identify the contexts in which diversity matters most and whether part of its impact is mediated through the extent of social capital.
Finally, all the empirical work undertaken in this paper seeks to explain the variation of growth and policy outcomes across countries. Since the explanatory variables are mainly initial conditions, these regressions are likely to be more robust than some in the literature: commonly used endogenous variables, such as investment, have deliberately been excluded. Even so, it remains the case that detailed historical analyses are also needed to understand fully the evolution of policy choices and how those choices are translated into outcomes. It should perhaps go without saying that, although cross-section econometrics can make a useful contribution, it can only take us so far in understanding the African experience.
